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Summary 
 
Recent developments in theories of practice have seen place and space taken 
explicitly into account. In particular, Theodore SCHATZKI’s ‘site ontology’ offers 
distinctive but as yet under-explored means of engaging with human geographies. 
By giving ontological priority to practices as constitutive of the social, this kind of 
practice theory provides an integrative conceptual framework that enables the 
analysis of diverse phenomena in relation to each other, over space and time, as 
they are constituted through practices. This article develops an outline agenda for 
bringing theories of practice, and particularly SCHATZKI’s ‘site ontology’, together 
with geographical inquiry. We elucidate this agenda through consideration of three 
contemporary preoccupations in human geography, comprising emotion, 
materiality and knowledge.  
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1 Introduction  
Theories of practice have been a presence in social theory for over a century. Never 
with a central role, they have nevertheless undergone cycles of revival and decline 
over the decades. From the closing years of the twentieth century, they have had a 
latest revival, as part of the gradual unwinding of social theory from the 
preoccupations that followed from the representational turn. This latest revival has 
been in part shaped by new developments in the loose tradition of practice theory, 
which we contend bring fresh resonances with the preoccupations of human 
geographers. In this article we set out what we see as the key dimensions of 
theories of practice and of these new developments, gathering around Theodore 
SCHATZKI’s ‘site ontology’, as a basis for arguing that human geography can benefit 
from engagement with contemporary theorisations of practice. 
Within theories of practice, practices are the central aspect of social life. Each 
practice consists of specific ways of doing and saying things, for example ways of 
consuming, working, or socialising. This includes particular ways of understanding, 
knowing how to use things and states of emotion (cf. RECKWITZ 2002, 249-50). 
However, theories of practice are not singular. Rather, they emerge from a bundle 
of writing authored over a century or more. These can be gathered together as 
having commonality in the priority they have given to practice as a feature of the 
social. While theories of practice have much longer intellectual roots, it was the 
writings of BOURDIEU (especially 1977 and 1990) and GIDDENS (1984) that initially 
inspired geographers to employ ideas of practice on any scale.  
Concepts from BOURDIEU have been widely used by German-speaking geographers in 
studies of a number of contexts (to name but a few DIRKSMEIER 2009, DÖRFLER et al. 
2003, DRILLING 2004, JANOSCHKA 2009, LIPPUNER 2006, ROTHFUSS 2006). Another take 
on practice stems from GIDDENS’ theory of structuration. It was introduced and 
popularised to the German geography audience by WERLEN (1999), causing a 
significant increase in actor-centred research. British geographers had an early start 
in taking up GIDDENS’ theory of structuration in the mid 1980s (GREGSON 1987), 
reworking much of it already in the early 1990s (THRIFT 1993). THRIFT’s (1996; 2008) 
non-representational theory (NRT) incorporated some of the central implications of 
theories of practice in general, highlighting a theoretical agenda that foreshadows 
some of our current concerns; that is, practices constitute our sense of the real; we 
need to valorise practical expertise, focus on presencing practices and the entire 
body including all its senses; we should be sceptical about the linguistic turn and call 
for an empathic understanding of people’s lives (THRIFT 1996, 7-8). 
From the 1990s, a novel take on practices has emerged and steadily gained in 
influence, formulated by US-American social theorist Theodore SCHATZKI, and 
discussed by German sociologist Andreas RECKWITZ. Though this work shares some of 
the tenets of NRT, it is not directly indebted to THRIFT’s and related writings 
(although see SCHATZKI 2007). It is also less dependent on the concepts of habitus, 
capital, and field (BOURDIEU) or rules, resources, and practical consciousness 
(GIDDENS). Rather, this body of work builds on a different strand of practice theory 
as a social ontology and theoretical vocabulary.  
SCHATZKI identifies the roots of his conceptualisation of social life as being 
constituted in and through practices with his reading of Charles TAYLOR (SCHATZKI 
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2002, 70). Dealing originally with the theoretical problems posed by behaviourism, 
TAYLOR (1971; 1984) suggested that practices should be the primary units of 
investigation since the ‘meanings and norms implicit in [...] practices are not just in 
the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves’ (TAYLOR 1971, 
27). TAYLOR’s outline of social practice provides precedent for the way in which 
SCHATZKI gives ontological and analytical priority to practices (SCHATZKI 1996). In his 
more recent work, SCHATZKI (2002; 2010) integrates his initial take on practice theory 
into what he calls site ontology. This is a much broader framework which attends 
not only to practice but to material and immaterial entities and how they relate to 
each other and so carry and constitute meaning, constituting what he calls orders or 
arrangements. This also includes the spatial dimensions of social life.  
In contrast to the geographical considerations of BOURDIEU or GIDDENS, there is as yet 
no detailed engagement with what is at stake for geographers when building on 
these recent developments in practice theory. Having said that, in our own work 
with a number of collaborators within and beyond Geography, we draw increasingly 
on SCHATZKI’s work (LAHR-KURTEN 2011, SHOVE et al. in press, JACKSON a. EVERTS 2010; 
see as well SIMONSEN 2007; 2010). Our aim here is to bundle our encounters with his 
writings in order to explore in what ways SCHATZKI’s work could be beneficial to 
geographical inquiry more broadly.  
So far, we can find occasional engagement with SCHATZKI’s take on practice theory in 
empirical work. This refers mainly to our own and others’ work on consumption 
cultures and the use of mundane objects such as DIY items (SHOVE et al. 2007, 
WATSON a. SHOVE 2008) the everyday practices of shopping (EVERTS 2009, EVERTS a. 
JACKSON 2009) or driving (WARDE 2005), Nordic Walking (SHOVE a. PANTZAR 2005) or 
waste disposal (GREGSON et al. 2009). Other geographical writings on culture as 
social practice also occasionally nods to SCHATZKI or RECKWITZ such as the work on 
practices and lives of entrepreneurs in Syria (BOECKLER 2005) or Berlin (PÜTZ 2004) or 
the practices of urban design (BRZENCZEK a. WIEGANDT 2009). 
Nevertheless, still missing is a more concerted effort to clarify what is at stake for 
geographers in engaging with this strand of practice theory, and specifically the 
overarching site ontology proposed by SCHATZKI.  
In writing this article, we seek to engage explicitly with practice theory and the site 
ontology as developed and articulated by SCHATZKI, in relation to current and 
perennial concerns of geographical inquiry. We offer a purposive reading of 
SCHATZKI’s work as a means to explore and demonstrate its applicability to current 
geographical thought and research. We begin by outlining key characteristics. 
Notably, practice is no longer an umbrella term on its own but tied to a site 
ontology that considers not only practice but also material and immaterial 
arrangements as crucial parts of social reality. From this foundation we consider 
what difference a site ontology approach makes to engaging with three current 
preoccupations of human geography: emotions, materiality and knowledge. This 
enables us to begin to elaborate the potential for bringing together human 
geography with SCHATZKI’s take on theories of practice. This provides a fundamental 
argument for geographers to engage more seriously with this strand of practice 
theory. 
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2 Practice theory and site ontology 
The move towards activity centred ontology recurs within each generation of 
theoretical writers and has a long tradition (RECKWITZ 2003). Remarkable to us in 
that respect is NIETZSCHE’S (1998 [1887], 29) claim that ‘there is no “being” behind 
doing, acting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction imposed on the doing – the 
doing itself is everything’. More recently, in sketching the intellectual lineage of 
contemporary theories of practice, RECKWITZ (2002; 2003) marshals a wide range of 
20th century theorists who can all be placed, retrospectively at least, in the tradition 
of theories of practice. Among others, he highlights the writings of HEIDEGGER and 
WITTGENSTEIN as important philosophical roots and the most elaborate and explicitly 
fleshed out practice theory based on both thinkers is provided by SCHATZKI, whose 
work we now consider in more detail. 
To begin with, SCHATZKI tries to create an ontology that ‘transcends rigid action-
structure oppositions’ (2001, 1). To a certain extent, he shares this endeavour with 
BOURDIEU and GIDDENS. However, SCHATZKI moves a step further when he seeks to 
establish his site ontology. According to SCHATZKI, site ontologies combine the 
approach of ‘practice theories’ (e.g. TAYLOR, DREYFUS, BOURDIEU, GIDDENS) with that of 
‘arrangement theories’ (e.g. those of LATOUR, LACLAU & MOUFFE, DELEUZE & GUATTARI). 
Whereas accounts of practice are focused on activity of any kind, arrangement 
theories seek to shed light on the ways that things and thoughts are connected 
within complex networks of entities (SCHATZKI 2002). Following SCHATZKI, 
arrangements of any kind are constituted in and through practice. Moreover, the 
practice of arranging entities of any kind equals a process of ordering. The outcome 
of that process is orders, comprised of entities such as material things, artefacts or 
organisms as well as meanings (ibid.). 
Thus, SCHATZKI draws on two basic concepts–practices and orders/arrangements–
defining the ‘the site of the social [as] a mesh of practices and orders’ (SCHATZKI 
2002, xii), whereby ‘practices and orders enable and constrain one another’ (ibid, 
117). In the following, we will explain first the particular concept of practice used 
within the site ontology and then turn to the arrangements and orders. 
 
Practices 
Most significantly, SCHATZKI’s approach tries to avoid an ‘intellectualisation of social 
life’ – a term used by RECKWITZ to denote the tendency of social scientists to read 
intention, motivation, reason or cause into routinised action and behaviour. 
However, this should not lead to any rigid analytical distinction between routinised 
actions on the one hand and intentional actions on the other. Practices consist of 
both types of actions or rather of various elements that are, to a greater or lesser 
degree, intentional or routinised (RECKWITZ 2009, 173). As RECKWITZ puts it, intentions 
still are part of a practice, yet like other elements they are just one part of practices 
and not the only element of interest (ibid., 291). All doings and sayings are parts of 
a practice. Practices such as the practice of governing, the practice of cooking or the 
practice of teaching consist of routinised bodily movements as much as of 
intentional and reflective thought. Characteristically, all elements of a practice, 
intentional or not, hang together in the way that the practice in question is 
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organised. Thus, SCHATZKI defines any given practice as ‘a ‘bundle’ of activities, that 
is to say, an organized nexus of actions’ (SCHATZKI 2002, 71) or ‘a set of doings and 
sayings’ (ibid, 73). 
It does not matter from this point of view, whether it is sayings or it is doings which 
are more pivotal for a given practice. Indeed, sayings are as much doings as any 
other bodily activity.  The linguistic turn may have ‘led some theorists to overvalue 
the significance of discourse in social life’ (SCHATZKI 2002, 77), for example in 
conceptualising practices as collections of sayings alone or slipping from discourse 
as articulated intelligibility to formulations that privilege language and neglect other 
doings (a problem also highlighted by non-representational theory). Sayings are 
distinctive: ‘for deep reasons [...] no one has yet fully fathomed, on most occasions 
uttering words says something in a way that squatting [on one’s heels, for instance] 
only rarely [...] does’ (SCHATZKI 2002, 76-7). Nevertheless, to avoid the pitfalls of 
taking this distinctiveness as grounds for over-prioritising speech and other 
representational doings, ‘an account of practices must not just mark the distinction 
between doings and sayings, but also grant each its proper due in both the 
perpetuation of practices and the articulation of intelligibility’ (ibid.). 
It is useful to exemplify the limitations of giving priority only to either sayings or 
doings. Within a practice such as that of shopping, it is possible to group doings 
such as touching an apple, or sayings such as chatting to a shopkeeper to the same 
project, that of shopping for food. Projects which, like that of shopping for food, are 
goal oriented provide the structure and contingent boundaries within which human 
practitioners navigate the flow and crossings of practices comprising everyday life 
(SHOVE et al 2007). Similarly, researchers must take the step of identifying distinct 
practices within the continuous unfolding of social life, such as the practices of 
shopping and food consumption (EVERTS a. JACKSON 2009), the practices of DIY 
(WATSON a. SHOVE 2008) or the practices of language promotion in France (LAHR-
KURTEN 2011).  
How do we know what pertains to one practice and not another? Since projects and 
ends do not belong to the individual but to practices, we need to look at the 
organisation of a practice; that is, the ways in which the nexus of doings and sayings 
is organised. Following SCHATZKI (2002), the doings and sayings of any given practice 
are organised by items of four types which are part of that practice (see Figure 1): 
First, there are ‘practical understandings’ which refer mainly to the ability to know 
how to do something and how to understand what other people do or in which 
practice they are engaged. The second link is formed by ‘rules’, i.e. explicit 
formulations, principles, precepts, and instructions that are interjected into social 
life for the purpose of orienting and determining the course of activity. Third, the 
sense of oughtness and acceptability coupled with ways of feeling and experiencing 
certain activities is what SCHATZKI calls ‘teleoaffective structures’. Fourth, there are 
‘general understandings’ that form a wider backdrop than practical understandings 
in so far as they are broad regimes of thought such as religious convictions or a 
sense of community.  
XXX [Figure 1: Items organising social practice (LAHR-KURTEN 2011)]  XXX  
Returning to the example of practices of food shopping, we could then investigate 
learned and trained skills such as separating fresh from mouldy apples, calculating 
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prices and knowing what provisions you need for preparing lunch, or to feed the 
family for the week, as practical understandings. The price tags, signposted parking 
lots, or cooking books are examples of rules. The pressure one feels for providing 
oneself and others with food, the pleasure of browsing and the aim to prepare a 
tasty dish can be considered under the rubric of teleoaffectivity. Lastly, notions of 
‘good’ food, be it in respect to a healthy, ethical, nutritious or affordable diet, linked 
with general notions of acting responsibly can be thought of as general 
understandings.  
 
Orders, Arrangements and Timespace 
Having conceptualised practices as an organised nexus of doings and sayings, we 
need to look at what is sometimes called the context for any given practice. 
SCHATZKI’s approach of a ‘site ontology’ above all differs from other practice theories 
through its second major concept, that of orders or arrangements respectively. 
SCHATZKI defines social orders as follows: 
‘Social orders are the ensembles of entities, through and amid which 
social life transpires – the arrangements of people, artifacts, organisms, 
and things that characterize human coexistence. All social life is marked 
by social orders. In such orders, moreover, entities relate, enjoy 
meaning (and identity), and are positioned with respect to one another. 
All social life exhibits, as a result, relatedness, meaning, and mutual 
positioning.’ (Schatzki 2002, 38) 
Orders comprise material and immaterial aspects of the social. Thus, material 
arrangements of a class-room or a shopping mall are likewise to be understood as 
orders as are discourses or imaginary spaces. All those kinds of orders are 
interwoven with practices that enable and constrain one another. In order to avoid 
the pitfalls of any implicit structuralism, it is important to underline SCHATZKI’s 
particular conceptualisation of orders: ‘Relations, positions, and meanings, like the 
arrangements of which they are aspects, are labile phenomena, only transitory 
fixations of which can be assured’ (SCHATZKI 2002, 24). In effect, there are no stable 
orders but only temporally and spatially unfolding sites that are made of the mesh 
of practices and orders. Change and becoming is integral to the site ontology:  
‘The mesh of practices and orders does not simply clear some paths and 
obliterate others. Rather, it figures them as more distinct or fuzzy, more 
threatening or welcoming, more unsurveyable or straightforward, more 
cognitively dissonant or soothing, smoother or more jagged, more 
disagreeable or appealing, and so on.’ (SCHATZKI 2002, 226) 
This ontology also has bearing on SCHATZKI’s conceptualisations of time and space. 
For SCHATZKI, spatial relations are part of what he calls social orders. He considers all 
entities that compose an arrangement to be physical, though exhibiting qualities 
that transcend their physicality; e.g. the position or meanings they have within the 
particular arrangement. In an earlier treatment of how to integrate space into social 
theory, SCHATZKI (1991, 654) stressed the spatial dimensions of social reality which 
‘is people’s interrelated being-in an interconnected world’. More recently, he 
elaborated his concept of timespace. Timespace denotes the connection of 
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existential temporality of present activity that departs from somewhere and is 
coming towards something and the arrays of places and paths amid and through 
which activity occurs. Thus, timespace is a feature of the organisation of practices 
that ‘engender a net of interwoven timespaces, a net of interwoven jointly 
instituted futures-presents-pasts and place-path arrays’ (SCHATZKI 2009, 40). 
In sum, the site ontology derived from practice theory works towards a dynamic 
and activity-oriented understanding of space and place. From that perspective, on 
the one hand, places only exist within and through activities that arrange 
surrounding entities and meanings. On the other hand, activities occur amidst these 
arrangements. In this way, meanings and entities are arranged and to which 
practices they pertain is a matter of practice itself, i.e. the way in which a practice is 
organised by understandings, rules and feelings. Practice itself is an organised nexus 
of doings and sayings that are neither fully intentional nor fully routinised but 
consist of both elements to varying degrees. In the following section, we try to 
explore what this ontology – a social world made of practices, doings, sayings, 
organisation, projects, arrangements, orders, timespace – can mean for 
geographical inquiry.  
 
3 Emotions, materiality, knowledge 
In exploring the potential value of theories of practice tied to the site ontology 
discussed above for geographical inquiry, we have selected three themes that have 
become increasingly important to human geographers; emotions, materiality, and 
knowledge. The first and second are interrelated since they both shift the focus of 
inquiry towards the ‘fleshiness’ of the world (cf. SIMONSEN 2007, KAZIG a. WEICHHART 
2009) and we will explore them in more detail. In comparison to these, the third 
one appears to pertain to the more ethereal realm of thoughts, ideas and 
discourses. However, from a practice theory point of view, knowledge is an 
overarching theme that addresses understandings as much as emotions and 
materiality that are embedded within practices. We understand emotions, 
materiality and knowledge as different foci of empirical research pertaining to the 
same social world, which, through theories of practice, can be all approached within 
the same conceptual framework.  
 
Emotions 
Geography’s encounters with places, landscapes, cityscapes or neoliberal politics 
have increasingly resulted in engagement with the emotional and affective qualities 
of the social world (cf. PILE 2010). For instance, Nigel THRIFT and others have 
attended to the ways capitalism and neoliberal orders are sustained through the 
engineering of affect, such as through the purposeful design of cityscapes that elicit 
playful consumerism and oust (unwanted) political activism (THRIFT 2004; 2008). 
Another line of inquiry stems from humanistic geography, a central aim of which 
was to analyse the sense of place, the various attachments, wants, desires and fears 
that characterise the experience of rooms, buildings, cities or landscapes (BUTTIMER 
1976, TUAN 1976). This endeavour has been taken up anew by geographers who are 
interested in the emotions implicated in human encounters with ‘nature’ (such as 
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phobias or death), things and artefacts (e.g. foodstuffs), or other people, places and 
practices (ANDERSON a. SMITH 2001, BONDI et al. 2005, SMITH et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, interlinked with both affect theories and emotional geographies, 
several strands of ‘geographies of fear’ have appeared recently that deal with 
socially significant and widespread fears and anxieties around crime, food, diseases, 
economic wealth or natural hazards (LAWSON 2007, PAIN 2009).  
We suggest that geographies of emotion and affect could benefit from theories of 
practice by adding to their agenda the ways in which emotions are practised, how 
being emotional is learned and unlearned and how affect resonates with practical 
understandings of knowing how to do things or how to proceed. Furthermore, it 
would add weight to accounts of emotions that already acknowledge the 
importance of practice such as PAIN a. SMITH (2008, 12), who state that fear ‘is an 
increasingly ingrained material practice’ (cf. JACKSON a. EVERTS 2010). 
In a co-authored paper involving one of the present authors, the proposition is to 
analyse events of anxiety such as pandemics or terrorism from a practice theory 
point of view as outlined above (JACKSON a. EVERTS 2010). Conceptualising anxiety as 
social practice opposes accounts that treat anxiety as an issue pertaining to 
individual bodies alone, be it as some form of individual phobia or personal 
pathology. Practice theory helps to open up the phenomenon of anxiety to a much 
broader analysis since anxieties ‘are embodied and social, practical and practised’ 
and like ‘other social practices, they are routinised, collective and conventional in 
character’ (JACKSON a. EVERTS 2010, 2801). It follows from this that we need to look at 
geographical and temporal variations of anxiety as they are practised and talked 
about, which variations determine the waxing and waning, spread and containment 
of that anxiety.  
The 2009 H1N1 A pandemic, also known as swine flu, for instance, denotes a real 
event that resulted from the viral reassortment and subsequent human to human 
transmission and global spread of a new subtype of swine-origin influenza virus. 
However, swine flu was also an event of anxiety that was brought about by various 
practices as much as it was dealt with through a manifold of practices in time and 
space. First of all, the scientific practices of laboratory and epidemiological 
research, combined with mappings and news media coverage, created ‘swine flu’ as 
an issue of global importance. Other social practices were engendered in reaction 
to those practices: production and stockpiling of vaccines, mass-slaughtering of pigs 
in Egypt, quarantine for slightly feverish air passengers in China, restrictions and 
cancellations of flights to Mexico and so on. Each individual practice contributed to 
the event of anxiety through intensifying and amplifying a sense of urgency in the 
face of a new disease with possibly catastrophic dimensions (see EVERTS 
forthcoming).  
Analysing a global event like swine flu from this angle shifts the attention to 
‘concrete goings on’ (SCHATZKI 2002, 222) that produce social phenomena such as 
the event of swine flu. It directs our gaze to what real people do and say, how they 
do and say things and which tools they use. For instance, drawing on preliminary 
findings from an ongoing project on pandemic anxiety by one of the present 
authors (EVERTS forthcoming), we can look at the epidemiologist travelling to the 
places of an alleged outbreak and interviewing patients, the cartographer mapping 
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‘cases’ or the journalist presenting and explaining the map to the public. We can 
break up each practice into projects unified by understandings that are property of 
the practice itself. For instance, epidemiological work needs to detect sources for 
infection (was it the country fair with accidental pig exposure or travel to and from 
Mexico?), cartographic work uses red colours to indicate danger and seriousness of 
the issue to the public or news reporting needs to be timely, prompt and visual, no 
matter how little data or how few substantive insights are available. Hand in glove 
with the understandings intrinsic to specific practices are routinised ways of feeling 
such as the excitement of epidemiological fieldwork, or the shrugging indifference 
of the cartographer who gets asked to produce yet another map of the pandemic, 
or the anxious tensions of health officials who hope to explain the seriousness of 
the threat to the public without instilling panic. 
But as much as we can use practice theories for analysing and understanding 
distressing global issues such as pandemics or terrorism, they can be equally helpful 
in drawing out intimate and very personal encounters that have been of interest to 
humanistic geographers for quite some time. The sense of place, for example, does 
not stem from a merely discursive figuration of what this or that place means. It is 
crucially created through practices that constitute the experience of place. It is only 
through practice that eventually a ‘feel for the place’ emerges. For instance, in 
describing the ‘emotional topography’ of Arctic landscapes in Iceland and 
Greenland, HASTRUP (2010) stresses the need for movement if one wants to grasp 
the Arctic: 
‘Only then did I realise how much life there was on the ice-clad fjord; by 
feeling small and insignificant myself, I was later able to interpret the tiny 
black dots on the ice as sleds, going in particular directions for seal. I had 
understood neither the magnitude of place nor the near-invisibility of 
people within it until I truly started moving about myself.’ (HASTRUP 2010, 
196) 
It is through motion and emotion that HASTRUP can relate to the people and the 
landscape she is studying. But what is more, ‘feeling small and insignificant’, a 
crucial emotional state for her interpretation of the Arctic landscape, was only 
achieved through practice, through doing the ‘emplacement’ that created feelings 
for place, space, scale and time. 
Following from this, we want to draw attention to at least one additional framing 
for inquiry in respect of emotion. SCHATZKI brings together the emotional with the 
intentional and motivational in devising his term ‘teleoaffective structures’. He 
stresses that the term ‘teleoaffective’ indicates the directedness of feelings, 
expressing how human activity is goal-oriented and organised in tasks, projects, and 
ends (SCHATZKI 1996). In our earlier example of shopping for food, consider how 
shopping can be as much rewarding as it can be frustrating, leading to emotions of 
joy or anger. Witness the porous contours of what is deemed to be acceptable 
when people complain about prices or get agitated in the queue, how they get 
upset when products that ought to be there are sold out. Working through the 
emotional side of life can yield important insights into the appropriateness and 
oughtness attributed to the various projects and ends in the pursuit of which 
people are engaged.  
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It follows from this that feelings are the embodied understandings, not least of 
what is right and wrong, good and bad and so on. Frustration, for example, emerges 
often when activity is thwarted by material or practical constraints such as the lack 
of money, the layout of a building, a crowd of people.  
Practice theories suggest that emotional bodily states are not just affective and 
beyond discursive control but on the contrary bound up and nestled into the 
formation of practical intelligibilities. Focusing through the lens of practice on how 
people feel toward different projects and ends, toward their own and others’ 
doings and sayings or toward the presence and absence or size and movement of 
people, organisms, artefacts and things can thus yield important insights into the 
make-up of social reality.  
 
Materiality 
Another important aspect of social reality of pivotal interest to geographers resides 
less in the teleoaffective structures that are one organising principle of practice but 
within the material world that is part of the arrangements and orders discussed 
earlier. Since the turn of the century, there has been increasing attention paid to 
the ‘material’ dimensions of human geographies. This ‘material turn’ (or return) can 
be placed as part of progression away from preoccupation with the representation 
which characterised much of human geography in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century, in the wake of a cultural turn which was in part defined by 
rejection of Sauerian cultural geography’s parochial interest in the materiality of 
landscapes. In the millennial year, JACKSON (2000) and PHILO (2000), both leading 
lights of the ‘new cultural geography’ from the 1980s, called for the re-
materialisation of social and cultural geography. JACKSON placed his call in the 
context of different literatures emerging from the mid 1990s, from fresh 
engagements with traditions of material culture, in geographies of consumption 
(GREGSON 1995) but also the then nascent impact of Science and Technology Studies, 
and in particular Actor Network Theory (BINGHAM 1996; MURDOCH 1997; WHATMORE 
1999). As the twenty first century gathered steam, these strands of engagement 
with materiality have matured and to some extent run together with other 
preoccupations characteristic of NRT including embodiment, touch, emotion and 
affect (ANDERSON and WYLIE 2009). 
Discussion of Actor Network Theory (ANT) most clearly indicates what is distinctive 
about contemporary engagements with materiality. For LATOUR, preeminent 
theorist of ANT 
‘Artefacts … construct, literally and not metaphorically, social order …. They 
are not 'reflecting' it, as if the 'reflected' society existed somewhere else 
and was made of some other stuff. They are in large part the stuff out of 
which socialness is made.’ (LATOUR 2000, 113) 
For ANT, materiality is not the passive backdrop to the goings on of the social, nor 
simply a screen on to which society projects and reads back its meanings. Rather, 
the material is an active component within the social, making possible and relatively 
durable our social and cultural relations. This reframing of the material, of the 
nonhuman, follows from a more fundamental theoretical move. For ANT, social 
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agency – the power to act and have effect – is not the property of human subjects, 
or indeed of any single entity. Rather, agency and action are effects, emergent from 
the relations between all manner of entities, both human and nonhuman (LATOUR 
2005). ANT illustrates, and to a significant extent underpins, contemporary 
geographical engagements with the material stuff of the social.  
Theorists of practice have also taken up the challenge of integrating the material 
into their conceptions. RECKWITZ grants objects a place in studying the social ‘insofar 
as they are necessary components of social practices’ (2002, 253). SCHATZKI too gives 
a role to materiality in his theorisation of practices, arguing that ‘understanding 
specific practices always involves apprehending material configurations’ (SCHATZKI et 
al. 2001, 3). However, this is a role defined in contrast to that characteristic of ANT. 
While LATOUR is included in RECKWITZ’S list of names comprising the tradition of 
practice theory (2002), the role he gives materials in constructing social order is 
contested by some within practice theory, for whom ANT’s denial of human agency 
as ontologically unique is profoundly troubling (SCHATZKI 2002; SIMONSEN 2007). 
Indeed, SCHATZKI (2002, 71) directly contests the ‘extension of the categories of 
actor and action to entities of all sorts’ and those who ‘contend that practices 
comprise the actions of various entities and not those of people alone’. For him, 
artefacts (human made), things (not human-made) and organisms (living entities 
other than humans) are not literally part of practices. Nor are they necessarily part 
of networks (LAW and LATOUR), discourses (LACLAU and MOUFFE) or assemblages 
(DELEUZE and GUATTARI). Rather, they comprise arrangements which, while co-
produced with practices are nonetheless distinct (SCHATZKI 2010b).  
This is more than semantics, with the concept of arrangements stressing the 
incompleteness and transitoriness of the resulting orders and retaining a place for 
human agency, in the capacity to ‘arrange’ things and to establish nexuses. 
The supermarket, as both a spatial-material arrangement and a loose set of 
practices conducted by the people in the processes of working and shopping, is a 
nice example. It is an arranged space that brings together a variety of things, 
artefacts and organisms such as walls, shopping carts, tills, artificial light, cans, 
plastic bags, foodstuffs and microbes. People moving in and out of that 
arrangement, pursuing largely routinised practices of bringing things in and taking 
things out, help to build, maintain and rearrange the arrangement. Through the 
recurrence of practice, the arrangement exists and persists; and without the 
continued re-occurrence of practice, it would cease to exist.  
On this formulation, distinguishing practices from arrangements, SCHATZKI contends 
that ANT attends only to the ‘arrangement’. It is not the network of entities which 
constitute social phenomena, but rather it is ‘the practices that are tied to 
arrangements’ which do so (SCHATZKI 2010a, 135). In this criticism lies the basis for 
recognising the unique potential of theories of practice for enriching our 
approaches to materiality. For some, it is not necessary to place materials outside 
of practices to recognise the limitations of existing engagements with materiality. 
SHOVE, PANTZAR and WATSON (SHOVE and PANTZAR, 2005; SHOVE et al., 2007; SHOVE et 
al., in press) locate materials firmly within the dynamics of practices. For example, 
the dynamics of the practice of skateboarding, can be read as the iterative co-
evolution of bodily skills, meanings and also materialities, as the board itself has 
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changed, through transitions such as that from skate parks to street skating. There 
is a recognisable process of co-evolution of the key materials of the practice 
(particularly the board) with the specific competencies and meanings of 
skateboarding, with incremental changes in what it is to do skateboarding resulting 
in incremental changes to boards which enable further changes in the actual doing 
(SHOVE et al., in press). Whether materials are understood as within practices or as 
comprising the arrangements with which practices co-exist, by appreciating 
individual artefacts and arrangements of nonhuman entities as emergent from the 
flow of practices, and of the shaping of subsequent performances of practices by 
those artefacts and arrangements, we gain fresh purchase on the role of materials, 
not only as sticky anchors of social relations (LAW, 1991), but as part of the flow of 
action through which social relations are both reproduced and iteratively 
transformed.  
 
Knowledge 
Though accommodating the emotional and the material, we also like to draw 
attention to RECKWITZ’s claim that practice theories are at heart cultural theories, 
interested in explaining the social by referring to knowledge. Most cultural theories 
share the assumption that one needs to scrutinise the ´constitutive rules´ to 
understand social life. For practice theories, knowledge is embedded in practices. It 
does not exist outside of performances of specific practices by skilled bodies 
engaging with the other elements of practice (WATSON a. SHOVE, 2008). In the words 
of RECKWITZ (2002, 253), paraphrasing SCHATZKI’s aforementioned four links of the 
nexus of doings and sayings, knowledge ‘embraces ways of understanding, knowing 
how, ways of wanting and feeling that are linked to each other within a practice’. 
This conception of knowledge also redistributes the material and the emotional 
within social theory. Objects are related to humans by know-how and 
understandings, which govern practices. Moreover, wants and desires do not 
belong to the individual alone. They are a form of knowledge that pertains to the 
teleoaffectivity of practice; ‘every practice contains a certain practice-specific 
emotionality’ (RECKWITZ 2002, 254). It often makes more sense to talk of 
practitioners instead of actors, emphasising the need to practice, to learn and to 
become skilful, as well as the processes of forgetting and unlearning. 
For geography, researching the situated processes of gathering the knowledge 
required to accomplish practices is a suitable task. Through a practice framing, this 
would imply a shift from only questioning which skills and knowledge we need, for 
instance, for shopping, driving, cooking, or calculating prices, to also clarify how this 
gets taught, how it is learned, how it travels between moments of performance, 
how it changes and is made anew (SHOVE et al., in press). In short, it would imply in 
the long run to drop the category of knowledge with its built-in stability claim and 
to elaborate the more procedural notion of ‘understandings’ as site- and practice-
specific ways of grasping what is going on, what makes sense to do and how to do 
it.  
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4 Conclusions 
Practice theory grounded within the site ontology insists on a nuanced treatment of 
the ‘spatial-temporal manifold of actions’ (SCHATZKI 1997, 285) that constitute 
practices. Building upon the above argument for human geography to engage with 
theories of practice anew, not least through SCHATZKI’s site ontology, we close by 
considering the implications of the approach for geographical inquiry. 
In social geography, social relations in space are of key interest. From a practice 
theory perspective, people’s lives hang together through practice. Groups of people 
are less defined then through categorisation such as age, sex or income but the 
various practices in which they are engaged, and from which the arrangements and 
orders which constitute such categorisations emerge and are reproduced. This 
means necessarily that the same person can participate in very different 
‘communities of practice’ (see below). Social inequalities are not excluded from that 
perspective. Focussing on practice entails a closer look at how the organisation of 
practice includes and excludes through understandings and rules that are inherent 
to that practice. Since practices transpire and bring about site-specific 
arrangements of entities of all kinds, geographers are able to analyse the fabric of 
social life along the lines of arranged entities, places and paths that a given practice 
builds on and to which it belongs; and the practices that constitute and make use of 
arranged entities, both material and otherwise. Though explanatory power in the 
case of social inequality such as unequal income contribution could be seen as one 
of the limitations of practice theory, this is one of the future challenges to show 
how such inequalities reside in and are produced by various practices: practices of 
hiring and firing, practices of salary bargaining, practices of bank loaning, or 
practices of educational categorising and selection. 
Another challenge for human geography remains its endeavour to keep the 
material conditions of our lifeworlds in sight. Through concepts such as 
arrangements and orders, practice theory offers a suitable vocabulary for this task. 
Terms such as arrangement and order retain the unique quality of human agency to 
arrange entities and read meaning into material objects. Artefacts and things are 
not invested with essential meaning but they become meaningful in and through 
practice. Furthermore, material objects do not necessarily belong to only one 
practice but can be constituted differently within different practices. Finally, 
material objects are part of the flow of actions, they influence the shape of any 
given practice and change with practice over time and space. 
In cultural geography, a focus on practice helps to conceptualise knowledge as 
understandings that arise from the nexus of doings and sayings as much as they are 
an organising part of that nexus. Moreover, emotions and feelings can be related to 
the world of meanings and knowledge by looking at how a given practice offers 
distinctive ways of feeling towards certain projects and ends, doings and sayings or 
presences and absences. In the example presented, anxious feelings in the context 
of pandemic events are integral to the way responding practices are organised and 
enacted.  
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By way of sketching future directions, we turn now to the dynamics of community 
formation and reproduction as one last point that we derive from our engagement 
with practice theory. Practices have the power to form communities, or, in fact, are 
constitutive of any community when competent bodies are brought together by 
engaging in the skilful performance of the same distinctive practice or set of 
practices. Thus, they interact and they might learn how to do or effectuate the 
practice in a better way. It is this emphasis on learning that has been pointed out by 
social anthropologist Jean LAVE and the learning theorist Etienne WENGER in the 
concept of ‘communities of practice’ (LAVE a. WENGER 1991) which we suggest 
complements SCHATZKI’s site ontology. The emergence and contours of communities 
of practice are not confined to co-presence or bound by place and we might as well 
investigate how practices can travel across space, reach new practitioners and form 
communities of practice. Increasingly, for example, a spatially distributed 
community clusters around the practice of ethical consumption that includes 
shopping for foodstuffs that were produced under ‘fair’ conditions (CLARKE et al. 
2007, ERMANN 2006, GOODMAN 2004). How has this happened? How do new 
practitioners enter the community, how do they get ‘skilled’ and how ‘skilful’ are 
they, and finally, how do some eventually ‘forget’ to perform the practice defining 
and maintaining the community? 
Researching communities of practice means to look into the various vehicles and 
attachments that connect the sites and entities engaged in the practice in question. 
Thus, it is not only interesting to ask who is drawn into specific practices and by 
whom but as well to clarify how this happens, through which connections, 
techniques, and materials, how and where different activities and the learning of 
these occur, and how that relates to different ways of feeling (for a more detailed 
treatment see LAHR-KURTEN 2011 on the practices of German language promotion 
within the French educational system). 
This discussion of communities of practice draws together and to a close our outline 
agenda for bringing human geography into productive communication with 
contemporary developments in theories of practice. As we have argued, ways of 
feeling can be investigated through discussing senses of oughtness and acceptability 
that are so pervasive in shaping the agreeability of doing things this way and not 
another. The materiality of social life can be accessed through the concept of 
arrangements. The spatiality of arrangements can be usefully complemented with 
geographical notions of the relationality of places and space. After all, practices 
make places and practices are in turn inherently spatial. Changing, transforming, 
destroying, preserving, protecting or maintaining any kind of place is dependent on 
the dynamic nexus of practices and arrangements which comprise it. In the ways we 
have discussed, at least, there are the clear grounds for human geographers to 
pursue the fresh lines and means of inquiry opened up by theories of practice and a 
site ontology.  
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